America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy

In fact, Daalder and Lindsays argument kind of sneaks up on you, in that the first section of the book almost ... almost ... seems pro-Bush. Unlike many of his critics, these authors are willing to give the guy a little credit for having a brain in his head and a firm, relatively well-defined, set of beliefs. They argue that the discreet facts Bush knows (citing the famous pre-election "pop quiz" of world leaders) are less important than the principles he believes, since the latter are the raison détre of his policy. As they note in an important chapter titled "Bushs Worldview," while GWB may not be able to articulate the underlying logic of his hegemonist worldview in "a form that would please political science Ph.D.s" [p. 41], those principles are deeply held and guide his thinking on strategic matters.

This might seem to be damning with faint praise. But its still more of an admission than well get from most subscribers to the kneejerk-but-tired caricature of Bush as a puppet whose strings are pulled by the neocons (or the oil companies, or Dick Cheney, or his dad, or whoever). What it also does, however, is set up the authors principal argument, that "the Bush revolution" can in fact be traced back to the president himself: his ideas, his declarations, and his decisions.

The conclusion seems to be not so much that this revolution is evil (the arguments here are utilitarian rather than moral, which isnt necessarily a bad thing) as it is poorly thought-out. The administration is surprised to discover that Americas historic friends and allies dont automatically line up behind the presidents priorities. That falling into disfavor with world opinion can actually have consequences for our foreign policy (and that even a "hyperpower" cant do everything by itself). That pre-emption and unilateralism dont work so well in cases like North Korea or Iran. That how to stabilize post-war Iraq should have given more thought in pre-war times. And that "with us or against us" bipolarism gets murky with countries like Pakistan or Saudi Arabia.

Ive read a handful of books in recent weeks about Americas descent into empire and this presidents new direction in foreign policy. While "America Unbound" lacks the wide historic lens of Chalmers Johnsons "The Sorrows of Empire," it is still a fine look at this president, his administration, his underlying principles, and their geopolitical consequences. Its restrained and logical tone -- unburdened by the polemical language of the Bush-hating Left -- ought to attract thoughtful and open-minded readers, and be a useful contribution to sober debate about the direction this nation is headed.

I expected better evidence and more solid arguments from a book which claims Bush, rather than 9-11, revolutionized U.S. foreign policy. The pre-9-11 unilateral foreign policy decisions made by Bush that are cited here (withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol and the ABM Treaty, for example) can hardly be considered revolutionary given the strong support for such moves during the Clinton administration among conservative intellectuals and Republican congressmen and senators. Bushs most controversial foreign policy doctrine to date - pre-emptive war - came after 9-11 and whatever plans Bush may or may not have had for Saddams Iraq prior to the terrorist attacks, nothing would have come of them without hijacked airliners crashing into New York City skyscrapers and the Pentagon.

Other arguments made in the book also do not point to a revolutionary foreign policy. Bushs strong moral language of good and evil when discussing foreign policy, for example, may be unfamiliar to foreign audiences and can be debated on its own terms, but it is of an accord with a not uncommon tendency in American foreign policy that can be found in the speeches of Ronald Reagan, John Foster Dulles, and Woodrow Wilson. Even John F Kennedys inaugural spoke of foreign policy in grandiose and stark terms such as "twilight struggle" between Communism and the West and "supporting any friend and opposing any foe".

Daalder and Lindsays thesis begs for some historical perspective, but beyond a rough sketch, they rarely provide it. Theyre content to look at Bushs foreign policy on its own terms, or in contrast to the foreign policy of his immediate successor, and then judge it revolutionary. They admit that foreign policy was not a priority when Bush came to office, and that 9-11 transformed the views of his administration in some ways, but they dont connect the dots. It was not Bush that revolutionized U.S. foreign policy; it was 9-11 that revolutionized Bushs foreign policy. The monumental project of nation-building currently underway in Iraq is proof of that.